Operation Safe Commerce –

Boston, A Model Port

Interim Project Report, April 2003

OSC Boston Mission Statement: *Boston – A Model Port represents a coalition of state, local and federal agencies, and private sector businesses united to enhance port and transportation security while facilitating commerce. Boston – A Model Port gathers and provides information regarding current security and safety practices in supply chains and critical port activities, assists in collaborative efforts to develop and share best practices for the safe and secure movement people, cargoes and conveyances, and tests and evaluates security technology and practical solutions, improvements and enhancements in vessel operations, waterside facilities and waterways management.*

OSC Boston Strategic Goal: *provide a demonstration model for the movement of people, cargoes and conveyances in the Port of Boston that maintains opportunities for growth, recreation, and commerce while improving security practices by using examples such as point-of-origin security, in-transit tracking and monitoring, and data-query capability designed to promote a safe, secure, and efficient port.*

POC: LCDR Tina Burke, tburke@msoboston.uscg.mil, 617-223-3001

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Executive Summary: Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, state and federal agencies immediately began to rethink the way in which safety and security is currently implemented at our nation's borders. During the past year, various working groups, task forces and other collaborative assemblies have contributed to efforts and activities focused on discovering deficiencies, establishing goals, and determining actions to enhance national security. These efforts have focused mainly on determining the entities and actions necessary to mitigate the risk of terrorism while maintaining normal port operations, as well as how to best manage the consequences of very possible future attacks. The "Model Port " initiative in Boston is one such effort. As is true of any large undertaking, there is still much work to be done. However, the participants have risen to the challenge and have begun to fight back in this new kind of war, using our greatest strength: our people.

The model port concept is Recommendation 14 in the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports' report published in the Fall of 2000. "Boston – A Model Port" (one of several Operation Safe Commerce (OSC) projects underway across the country) is one collaborative materialization of Recommendation 14. In Massachusetts, this initiative has brought together various federal, state, local, and industry representatives with a stake in maintaining an effective maritime transportation system in and around Boston. The initiative has garnered executive level support and participation from important government and political leaders, including the Coast Guard District Commander, the Mayor of Boston, Boston's Police and Fire Commissioners, the Port Director for Customs, the Director of Massachusetts' Office of Commonwealth Security, the Director of Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency, and others. The overall goal of the initiative is to enhance port and transportation security while facilitating commerce.

The concept for Boston's Model Port initiative was developed over several months during the early part of 2002. After a number of meetings with appropriate stakeholders to determine the scope and direction such an initiative should take, a Steering Committee was formed and a formal charter was signed in June of 2002. The charter is included as Appendix A. The charter outlines the concept, membership, goals, and timeline, and also establishes six separate work groups to address various functional areas within the port. They address the areas of Containers, Large Passenger Vessels, Port Security Plan, Consequence Management, Intelligence Networking, and Bulk Liquid Cargoes, and function as the "operating arm" of the Port Security Committee. Each group was chartered specifically by the Steering Committee and is led by a volunteer agency or industry representative. From April 2002 to October 2002, the work groups met on numerous occasions, ultimately determining a baseline security assessment and then identifying areas for improvement. In October of 2002, the work group leaders presented their findings, as well as recommendations for future action/security enhancements to the Steering Committee.

In summary, the **Bulk Liquid Cargoes** group worked to expand the concepts that were applied to the Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) system serving Boston directly after 9/11 to other tank vessel operations. These concepts consisted of pushing the borders out, and establishing a closed

loop supply chain security system in order to develop confidence that bulk liquid vessels did not pose an overwheming threat to the port. It also recommended some locally based initiatives such as implementation of a Vessel Traffic Information System (VTIS) for tracking of maritime traffic, establishment of security zones around all tank vessels, and the integration of security concerns into port development processes. In the area of **Large Passenger Vessels**, a comprehensive list of good security practices was developed for each phase of cruise ship operations. Additionally, specific measures were identified for immediate implementation such as a "declaration of security" between vessel and terminal security officers upon cruise ship arrival, and a positive communication from cruise ship security officers regarding compliance with the vessel security plan prior to port entry. The **Container** work group sought to identify local measures that could supplement the national container initiatives recently implemented by US Customs. This group recommended, among other items, the construction of a container stripping facility onboard the port's container terminal, and a more robust program to inspect targeted containers offshore using new technologies. The **Port Security Plan** work group made great strides in determining vulnerabilities in the port, identifying and ranking critical infrastructure, and cementing relationships with law enforcement partners to carry out operations plans during times of increased threat. A draft plan is in currently in place, and the next step is the development of security plans for private sector entities that integrate with the umbrella plan and detail specific measures for each maritime security threat level. The **Consequence Management** group has developed a standard response framework for response to weapons of mass destruction incidents, and has enlisted the assistance of the Massachusetts National Guard Civil Support Team to conduct facility threat assessments as well as develop emergency procedures. Lastly, in the **Intelligence Networking** realm, excellent progress has been made linking the activities and information sharing amongst the various law enforcement and intelligence entities with responsibility in and around port areas. This group also conducted outreach to private industry and provided information on various avenues to obtain access to industrial intelligence sources.

While the remainder of this report outlines the specific findings and recommendations regarding port security in each functional area, it can be said that overall there are many vulnerabilities in each of the MTS segments in and around the Port of Boston. However, there has been substantial progress. Some emerging best practices have been identified, and the security posture of the port has been raised significantly since 9/11. The objective for the future is to implement security improvements suggested in the work group forums to close gaps, to review additional best practices as they are developed nationally to enhance security and efficiency of the local Maritime Transportation System (MTS), and to seek funding for improvements as appropriate.

The OSC Boston A Model Port Steering Committee members, listed here, have been instrumental in the progress of this initiative as outlined herein and have provided concurrence with respect to the report's contents:

Capt Brian Salerno – Coast Guard
Nancy Gilcoine – INS/CBP
Joseph McKechnie – Tracetebel LNG
Thatcher Kezer – Mayor's Coalition
Nora Ehrlich – Customs & Border Protection
Commissioner Paul Christian – Boston Fire
Capt Dan May – Coast Guard
Commissioner Paul Evans – Boston Police
Richard Swensen – MA Exec Office Public Safety/Commonwealth Security
Ted Distaso – FBI
Paul Nevins – Irving Oil
Michael Leone – Massport
LT Robert Guiney – Boston Harbormaster
Stephen McGrail – MEMA
Capt Mark VanHaverbeke –Coast Guard D1
Capt William Webster – Coast Guard D1
Chief Richard Serino – Boston EMS

Background: In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, a flurry of concern erupted regarding follow-on attacks, including those that might occur in the maritime environment. In Boston, the unknown threat resulted in the Coast Guard Captain of the Port temporarily suspending Liquefied Natural Gas Carrier (LNGC) transits through Boston Harbor, a waterway surrounded by a densely populated metropolitan area and critical infrastructure. In order for LNGC transits, and shipments of LNG critical to the region, to resume both the Coast Guard and local political leaders needed to be sure appropriate security measures and consequence management plans were in place to reduce the risk these vessels might pose to the surrounding community and the port. This volatile situation forced an intense, multi-agency and LNG operating company effort to address and ensure security during all phases of an LNG evolution. Especially important was the need to identify and implement methods to imbed security into the entire transportation process.

Together with the operating company and law enforcement partner agencies, the Coast Guard developed a very robust security plan whereby LNGCs were permitted to enter the port again, as they had been doing for over 30 years. Initially, the vessel underwent extensive examination at the harbor entrance, taking an entire day to complete. After a few transits, the need to find efficiencies was apparent. With the company's assistance, Coast Guard members were sent to the loading port in Trinidad to assess the security in place there, and to establish contacts at the U.S. Embassy to gain a complete assessment of the overall security situation.

It was found that the security was actually very good. Additionally, the Coast Guard began periodically sending teams of inspectors to ride the LNG tanker as it made the transit from Trinidad to Boston. They were able to perform all of the necessary pre-arrival inspections enroute, and also examine shipboard security procedures during the entire voyage, which allowed entry into port without the loss of a full day for inspection. The Coast Guard also acquired access to the vessels' automatic positioning data, so that suspicious deviations from the expected route could be identified even without riders aboard. Additional security measures at the discharge port (Boston) were an integral part of the system as well, including armed escort of the LNGC during transit through the harbor, enforcement of a waterside security zone while moored, and additional facility security shoreside. Because the LNG vessels operate in what eventually is now viewed as a closed loop, with in transit visibility, there is now high confidence in the security at the loading port, , leading to an entry process that is reduced to the absolute minimum necessary.

While LNG is a unique operation, and not all aspects of the industry operate on such dedicated runs, there are aspects of the LNG experience that lend themselves, by extrapolation, to other marine industries. Certainly, pushing the borders overseas and imbedding security into the entire transportation process can have parallels in other industries. If point-of-origin security for containers existed, for example, as well as in-transit visibility on container vessels from the load port through their arrival at destination, then a greatly enhanced confidence in security for Boston would exist as the boxes move through the port.

It is this experience with LNG and this line of thinking that gave rise to the OSC Boston A Model Port initiative. Because the Port of Boston represents a microcosm of several major types

of maritime trade, i.e. containers, bulk liquid, large passenger vessel, etc., it provided a good test bed for security enhancements similar to the LNG example that might, over time, be identified as best practices that could be applied on a larger scale at other ports. Best practices aside, any security improvement is beneficial in the quest to deter, detect, and respond to acts of terrorism in the maritime environment.

In April of 2002, the Captain of the Port (COTP) Boston and the First Coast Guard District hosted a Model Port Summit where this concept was presented to nearly 100 port stakeholders. A workshop followed the executive level speakers, whereby the port stakeholders broke into groups based on functional port areas to discuss the current security posture, brainstorm ideas for improvement, and ultimately determine if a formal, long term work group should be formed to address the issues. As a result, a formal Model Port Steering Committee was formed, six separate work groups were named, and a leader for each group was selected. The results and findings of each work group, developed between June 2002 and March 2003, are provided below.

Summaries, Progress, Gaps and Recommendations by Work Group:

Bulk Liquid Cargoes

The strategic goal of the Bulk Liquid Cargoes group is to provide best practices to the Steering Committee for the safe, secure and efficient handling and movement of bulk liquid cargoes through the Port of Boston. Boston is home to various types of bulk liquid cargo operations, including Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), and several types of refined petroleum products such as jet fuel. These industries are economically significant for Massachusetts, and also for the entire New England region. New England uses more petroleum products than the United States as a whole, by percentage, to meet space heating, electric generation, and transportation needs, with all of its supplies coming from domestic and foreign imports. The Chelsea Creek oil facilities alone represent 14 percent of New England's capacity and 46 percent of Massachusetts' capacity for petroleum shipments. If one specific facility, Conoco-Phillips, were unable to receive shipments of jet fuel every 5 to 7 days, Logan International Airport would be in jeopardy of major disruptions due to lack of fuel supply. (MA DOER Report, Fall 2002).

The group, comprised of government agencies, LNG and oil facility and vessel representatives, and trade associations, reviewed current industry safety and security practices with an eye toward documenting positive measures already in place, and then identifying areas for improvement. Members represent the following entities:

LEADERS:	
Kent Lines/Irving Oil, Inc. – Richard Goddard, Neil Graham, Paul Nevins	USCG Marine Safety Office – LCDR Brian Downey
MEMBERS:	
MA Petroleum Council – John Quinn	Moran Shipping Agency - Steve Palmer
Conoco-Phillips Terminal – Dave Mehringer	Boston Harbor Spill Co-op – Dave Mehringer
Tractebel LNG – Joe McKechnie	Boston Towing & Transport – Dave Galman
MA State Police – LT Ed Connolly	Citgo Marine Terminal – Scott Gebbie
Global Terminal – Ron Kenny, Bruce Lenniham	Gulf Oil Terminal – Kevin McAteer
Chelsea EMA – Alan Alpert	Boston EMA – Chief Robert Calobrisi
City of Boston – Brian Glascock	Everett Fire – Chief David Butler

Positive Findings & Progress Made: The group identified numerous items which have been implemented since 9/11 to improve security and efficiency in the Bulk Liquid industry. They include:

- "Closed loop" supply chain security for LNG transits
    - Facility security surveys at foreign load port by USCG
    - LNGC ship rider program
    - Security program onboard vessel
    - In-transit visibility of LNGC location with VIPS
    - Security zone and exams upon arrival and port entry
    - Enhanced terminal security plan
    - Restrictions on air space above LNGC in transit

- Coast Guard sharing crew information with US Customs and INS at 96 hour notification for pre-arrival background checks & coordination of agency actions upon arrival
- Vessel personnel screening at 96 hour timeframe, allows discrepancies to be addressed precluding ship delays
- Security checklists developed by Coast Guard enable more rapid clearance for port entry
- Monitoring of critical bridges, staging/quick response of LE assets (i.e. Tobin Bridge for LNG transits) during vessel transit periods
- Most tank vessel companies have standard security policies including routine stowaway searches, deck watches in constricted geographic areas or anchor, etc.

Areas for Improvement & Recommended Action:

AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT	METHOD	NOTES
No constant communication to/from vessels or positive tracking during transit through port area	VTIS	Would require staffing in addition to hardware
Access to tank vessels to prevent "Cole" attack	Adjust security zone status	
Port Planning & waterfront redevelopment designs need to be compatible in purpose & design with short and long range port operation	Dialogue with MA Coastal Zone Mgt and Boston Redevelopment Authority	
Education of waterfront community on suspicious activity	Outreach/education	Continue through Coastwatch Program
Exposure of vessels in transit or at anchor to small boats	Control of small boats/VTIS, security zone	
Screening process based on 96-hour advanced notice of arrival needs better coordination/improvement: Feeds by other critical agencies (FBI, NCIS), consistent criteria for HIV designations		National scope
No Point of Origin Security Assessment for Bulk Oil Vessels	TBD – Consider foreign terminal assessment in Canada	
No In-transit visibility for Bulk Oil Vessels	TBD – Consider ship rider program on designated frequent caller vessels	

Large Passenger Vessels and Facilities

The Large Passenger Vessel work group's purpose is to develop and implement best practices that reduce acts of terrorism and other hazards involving vessels and facilities which support the Large Passenger Vessel Industry in the Port of Boston. Boston's large passenger vessel industry has boomed over the past five years, currently boasting service to over 250,000 passengers per year with approximately 90-100 cruise ship visits to the city's Black Falcon Cruise Ship Terminal annually.

This group conducted an in-depth examination of each phase of passenger vessel operations (transit, vessel security, waterside security, landside security, identification, screening, fuel, communications), and outlined best management practices for these phases in each Maritime Security threat (Marsec) level. From this exercise, as well as research into other best practices within the cruise ship industry, the group identified gaps and provided recommendations for actions to address shortfalls. The members represent the following entities:

LEADERS:	
Massport – Mike Leone, Joe Lawless	
MEMBERS:	
USCG Marine Safety Office – Capt Salerno, LCDR Burke, LT Buckley	Royal Caribbean Cruise Line – Howard Newhoff
Massport Fire/Rescue – Jim McGinty	MA State Police – Sergeant Fletcher
INS – Nancy Gilcoine	Moran Shipping – Ross Pope
P&O Ports – Walter Egge	US Customs – Joe Crowley
Boston EMA – Chief Robert Calobrisi	Norwegian Cruise Line – Capt Slepnes

Positive Findings & Progress Made: The group identified numerous items which have been implemented since 9/11 or are in progress to improve security and efficiency in Boston's Large Passenger Vessel Industry. They include:

- Update/enhancement of Black Falcon Terminal Security Plan in accordance with NVIC 4-02, addresses actions at each Marsec Level
- Included in updated Plan is a "Declaration of Security" between Vessel Security Officer and Terminal Security Officer to ensure all security items covered during port calls
- All ship's stores screened by US Customs Xray truck
- Strict access control & screening as part of Vessel Security Plan – ensures security of vessel at foreign ports
- State Police Tactical Response Teams specially trained for terrorism response, have State PD liaison at Terminal
- Police dive teams & canine explosive detection teams supplement security forces at Terminal
- State Police marine units have drafted legislation for ability to enforce federally established restricted zones around cruise ships
- MSO Boston implemented program to inspect cruise ship security plans on first arrival to Boston during 2002 cruise ship season

Areas for Improvement & Recommended Action:

AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT	METHOD	NOTES
No pre-arrival report from Vessel Security Officer (VSO) regarding onboard security status/issues	VSO notifies vessel agent affirming compliance w/Vessel Security Plan; must occur prior to clearance	Plan to implement for 2003 cruise season
Lack of coordination between vessel and terminal security plans; Massport does not maintain copy of vessel security plan for each calling vessel	Signed Declaration of Security prior to port entry	Included in Facility Security Plan; implement 2003 cruise season

Increase controls over vessels/crew approaching cruise ship	Improve on Background checks on crew, inspection of tugs, pilot boat, etc. and boardings prior to approaching cruise ship 2. Implement boom-type technology around cruise vessel to foul small vessel propulsion systems	Focus Marsec II/III
Inadequate number of cruise ship crew members with basic security awareness training	Greater number of crew receives security/ awareness training	IMO or through Cruise Ship companies
Armed protection of cruise ships while moored to prevent "Cole" style attack	-Seek additional CG resources -enable state police to enforce security zones	State legislation allowing officer to enforce federal security zone is in progress
Improve Identification of personnel onboard Terminal	Need authority to conduct background checks & issue IDs	National scope
Improve inspection of fuel barges approaching cruise vessel	Enhance operation inspecting tugs & barges prior to bunkering ops	
Response/emergency evacuation plan for Terminal	Develop plan	
Command and Control	Construct CCTV, intrusion detection perimeter wired to command center	Require Funding

Container Vessels and Facilities

The container work group, led by U.S. Customs, is focused on developing security measures and supply chain efficiencies to be employed in the handling, transferring, storing, and transporting of containers through the Port of Boston. P.W. Conley Terminal is Boston's only container terminal, located in South Boston directly across the Reserved Channel from the Black Falcon Cruise Ship Terminal. The number of imported containers averages 3,000 per month while exports average 1,000 per month. The terminal receives barge feeder service from Halifax weekly, container ships from Europe and Asia, and services approximately 200 container vessels per year.

U.S. Customs has recently implemented a number of initiatives to enhance container security nationwide. These include programs such as conducting overseas load port inspections/ assessments, applying risk analysis to target high risk containers for inspection at U.S. ports, and requiring submission of cargo manifests 24 hours prior to loading a vessel. Boston's Model Port container group is interested in implementing local enhancements to improve security and efficiency even further. Group membership includes:

LEADERS:	
U.S. Customs – Mike Cunningham	

MEMBERS:	
Massport – Tim Keefe	USCG Marine Safety Office – LT Benson
MA Emergency Mgt Agency – Pat Twiss	Boston EMA – Steve Morash
Mediterranean Shipping Co.- John Crowley	MA Commonweath Security – Brian Greely

Positive Findings and Progress Made:

- U.S. Customs has 2 dedicated Xray trucks in Boston. Typically a very high percentage (100% of targeted containers and on the order of 60% of all remaining containers) are screened as they are offloaded at the terminal.
- Held demonstration at Conley terminal to familiarize all group members with containers, terminology, and the X-ray truck. Planning for container vessel familiarization tour for the same purpose
- U.S. Customs has received new technology - radiation isotope detectors, telescopic cameras, that will assist in positive and rapid identification of potential WMD sources
- U.S. Customs and CG developing offshore intercept/evaluation of specified containers targeted under ATS (automated targeting system)
- Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has the ability to obtain information on any given container at any time through various methods

Areas for Improvement and Recommendations:

AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT	METHOD	NOTES
Need a container stripping facility on the seaport terminal to avoid "dangerous" containers being transported through populated areas to stripping facility	Build stripping facility at Conley Terminal	Requires funding
Seal verification is not always an effective way to ensure container has not been accessed (can get in w/o breaking the seal)	-Find other ways to assure integrity -Don't rely on seals	
Need to track history of containers themselves beyond last few ports of call	Obtain shipping company equipment tracking records	Beyond requirements of Customs' national initiatives like CSI, C-TPAT, etc.
Export container screening	Install fixed Xray or detection system at gate	Requires funding; traffic flow issues
All agencies w/container jurisdiction should be educated on all container-related programs	Conduct Multi-Agency Strike Force Operation/Awareness session	
Need contingency plan for when anomaly detected in a container (radiation, etc.) prior to installing any type of fixed device	Work with consequence mgt group	
At sea container inspection w/new technologies	Develop CG/Customs at-sea interception capability	Need criteria; commerce flow issues
Point of Origin foreign facility security assessment for container vessels	TBD – Work with US Customs to assess container facilities overseas	Focus on Canada first

Port Security Plan

The purpose of the Port Security Plan work group is to support the "Boston A Model Port" initiative by focusing on coordination among port stakeholders in the planning for, and implementation of, security measures within the Port of Boston under various threat conditions. Since the formation of the work group, there has been a proliferation of guidance and the development of numerous programs supporting the Port Security Plan concept. The group kept track of these dynamics and adjusted its activities to best meet expectations and the needs of the port stakeholders.

The work group includes key port stakeholders who have volunteered to represent their specific port community in the port security plan development process. Membership was limited in order to facilitate the "working" nature of the group. Members of the Port Security Plan work group represent the following entities:

LEADERS:	
USCG Marine Safety Office – LCDR Burke, LT Benson	
MEMBERS:	
FBI – Ted Distaso	ConocoPhillips Terminal – Dave Mehringer
Distrigas LNG Terminal – Mark Skordinski	Peabody & Lane Agency – Bill Eldridge
Boston Pilots – Capt Larry Cannon	Boston Towing & Transport – Capt Dave Galman
Naval Criminal Inv Service – John Deveney	MA Emergency Mgt Agency – Kevin Tully
US Customs – Nora Ehrlich	Massachusetts Bay Lines – Jay Spence
Massport – Joe Lawless	INS – Nancy Gilcoine
USS Constitution – CDR Dave Smith	Office of Naval Investigation – LCDR Kenney

Positive Findings & Progress Made: The following lists progress made to date with respect to the Port Security Plan. Despite the noteworthy progress, it should be noted that restrictions on sharing security sensitive information continues to impede full participation & complete coordination of all stakeholders (both governmental and non-governmental) in the planning and decision-making processes.

- Local port vulnerability assessment conducted using Port Security Risk Assessment Tool, once in 2002, updated w/new PSRAT version in Feb 2003.
- Completed prioritized list of critical infrastructure for COTP Boston zone
- Formal CG Port Security Assessment (PSA) conducted Aug/Sep 2002, report received by COTP Jan 2003.
- Completed terrorism point of contact list for critical port agencies/stakeholders
- Developed and exercised "call down" network to inform port stakeholders of change in Marsec Level
- Established security zones in critical port areas and conducted outreach campaign
- Completed draft matrix of partner agency actions during Marsec Levels
- Completed draft Port Security Plan in accordance with NVIC 9-02
- Implemented highly effective Coastwatch program to educate maritime community on suspicious activity and provide hotline for reporting

- Distributed ATTF's threat/suspicious activity notification form for port stakeholders to receive rapid response
- Distrigas has submitted a Facility Security Plan in accordance with NVIC 11-02, setting example for other facility operators
- Massachusetts FOIA laws have been amended to protect proprietary and sensitive information
- MSO Boston personnel conduced security surveys on regulated maritime transportation related facilities and small passenger vessel operations throughout the zone, obtained baseline of security measures prior to security plan regulations under MTSA 2002

Areas for Improvement and Recommendations:

AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT	METHOD	NOTES
Need ability to share PSA and prioritized infrastructure lists w/PSP work group members	Share when able	Awaiting HQ clearance for PSA; review/use Comdtinst 5510.5 procedures for other
Establish additional security zones in critical areas	Consider additional vessels, bridges, facilities, Regulated Navigation Area	Establishment vs. enforcement capability
Fine tune coordinated agency response at each Marsec Level	Develop Incident Action Plan specifying roles	Issue of federal "mandates" on state resources
Facilities need to develop plans w/security actions for each Marsec Level	Write plans using NVIC 11-02	MTSA regulations will require
Vessels need to develop plans w/security actions for each Marsec Level	Write plans using NVIC 10-02	MTSA regulations will require
Port worker identification/credentialing system		National scope – COTP Order issued to critical facilities requiring access control & positive ID
Ancillary ports need to be more involved in PSP development process	-Add key ancillary port personnel to Port Security Committee -Hold workshops to assess ancillary port risks locally; provide assessment methodology fm NVIC 11-02	
Expand Port Security Committee membership as needed per PSP NVIC 09-02		
Port-wide port security training/exercise program	Implement training/exercise program	

Consequence Management

Although it does not directly address deterrence and prevention of terrorist attacks, consequence management is a critical element in mitigating event impacts and efficiently re-establishing maritime transportation system functionality should a terrorist strike occur. This work group was developed to work in coordination with Boston's well-established Maritime Incident Resources and Training Partnership (MIRT). The MIRT was instituted approximately a decade ago to address and coordinate marine firefighting issues amongst the responsible municipalities, other government and public safety agencies, and the marine industry. As a result of the Model Port initiative, the MIRT has been called upon to expand its role within the port in order to address response issues stemming from chemical, biological, or radiological incidents, and to coordinate the response efforts of a multitude of jurisdictions and agencies that would be involved in such an incident. This summary includes some activities that overlap with other work groups.

The Consequence Management work group includes the people listed in the table below. Some have been attending members. Others have provided comments on deliverables:

LEADERS:	
MIRT, Massport Fire/Rescue – Dennis Keenan	
MEMBERS:	
Alpert, Alan Chelsea EMA	McGrath, Gabrielle USCG
Butler, David Everett Fire	O'Brien, Eddie Mass Maritime Academy
Collins, Jack BEMA/LEPC	Spellacy, Martin NG 1st CST
Chisolm, Russ FBI	Sullivan, William Chelsea Fire
Cusolito, Peter NG 1st CST	Terenzi, Phillip BPD Special Ops
DeLeo, Carolyn USCG	Thompson, David State Police AATU
Doherty, John BFD/LEPC	Tommaney, John MEMA
Irving, Ken Mass Maritime Academy	Wellock, Brad Massport Contracts & Reg.
Ladd, David DFS Hazmat	Williams, Gary LT USCG
Lawlor, Stephen Boston EMS	

Positive Findings and Progress Made: Weapons of Mass Destruction Consequence Management is a daunting and highly complex problem, requiring the effective coordination of unprecedented numbers of agencies/entities including, but not limited to law enforcement, public safety, emergency management, public health, and private industry . Planners for WMD response are further challenged by the need for a functional incident/unified command structure that can effectively organize the dozens of agencies involved to address a multitude of problems simultaneously (hazmat release, terrorism investigation, fire, care for injured people, etc) vice one specific problem (oil spill cleanup). Although the recent HSPD-5 calls for a national Incident Command system, it will take time for all involved to become familiar with the system.

- Drafted & distributed a comprehensive questionnaire to gather pertinent information from agencies and port industry (such as threat assessments, PPE, communications, mobile command posts, contact lists, etc.). Results may be combined with a recent MIRT survey to build a comprehensive, updatable resource for planners.
- Unified/incident command and organization issues for a large-scale response were discussed in depth at the Marine Firefighting tabletop exercise held Sept 2002. Many of these concepts will be directly applicable to WMD planning scenarios.

- Engaged MA National Guard Civil Support Team to conduct 2 sample threat assessments at local facilities, starting with Conley container terminal. These threat assessments will result in a bound document and CD-ROM that can be used in both planning and response.
- Developed a base-line framework addressing key initial actions in WMD response that would help first responders collect the information they need to develop more specific action plans, depending on the material released. This framework will be combined with the USCG WMD Contingency Plan (in development) and several informational annexes (in development). Details regarding this deliverable are available from the Work Group.
- Conducted shipboard familiarization, and LNG facility familiarization for port-area land-based fire fighters. Plans are being developed to expand this program to FBI hazardous materials response teams as well.

Areas for Improvement and Recommendations:

AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT	METHOD	NOTES
Need a centralized, portable, current response asset database available to Incident Commanders	(in addition to general plans, above) -compile survey results -research whether portions exist already -research existing databases & interagency accessibility	Boston Emergency Medical Services has access to a public safety database
No one agency responsible for keeping information current	Designate agency	
Need to understand response plans that exist within municipalities	Obtain copies & establish routine mechanism to incorporate them into new plans	
Need to understand specific threats in terms of chemical, biological, nuclear, to focus planning	-Continue with CST site surveys -Assess whether or not a state agency is willing to extend the program of site surveys & take responsibility for incorporating & updating results	
Incident Command/Unified Command & communication plan needs more definition	-Develop consensus on UC organization & information flow for WMD incidents	Group recommends that Model Port infrastructure be used to discuss how HSPD-5 will be implemented in the region.
Need to formally address FOIA concerns of agencies and businesses responding to assessment surveys		

Intelligence Networking

Just as with other areas of the nation, port areas are reliant upon appropriate agencies being informed of potential or actual threats for effective deterrence, detection, and response against terrorism. In Boston, there is a Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), that investigates potential or actual terrorist activity with the overall purpose of detecting, deterring, and responding to

terrorist incidents. There is also a Massachusetts Anti-Terrorism Task Force (ATTF), which focuses on coordination amongst all agencies and entities with respect to training, information sharing, and outreach/awareness on matters of terrorism. The Intelligence Networking group under Model Port seeks to build bridges between the port community and other intelligence gathering or sharing efforts already in existence. The work group meets monthly to share port-related intelligence and to discuss current security-related activities or initiatives, special port events, etc. The work group leader additionally provides a link to both the JTTF and the ATTF's efforts, ensuring the port community is kept apprised of relevant information.

Members include:

LEADERS:	
FBI – Ted Distaso	USCG Marine Safety Office – LT Benson
MEMBERS:	
NCIS/JTTF – John Deveney, Tim King	Boston Police Dept – Sgt Phillip Terenzi
INS – John Fernandez, Mike Perrella	CGIS – Jack Miniter, Tom Atkinson
MA Environmental Police – Mike Scibelli	National Park Service – Glen Van Neil, Robert Ditolla
US Customs – Jim Dargan, Mike Cunningham	US Navy ONI – LCDR Kenney/LCDR Amaral
USCG D1(ole) - LTJG Larrabee	USCG Group Boston
USCG Station Point Allerton	MA State Police Dive Team – Leo Gerstel
Weymouth Harbormaster	Federal Aviation Administration – Buddy Borgioli
MA State Police – Thomas Kalil, Aldo D'Angelo, Al Thompson, Ed Connolly, Sgt Freeman	Boston Harbormaster – Robert Guiney
Salem PD – Mike Andreas	Weymouth Harbormaster – Paul Milone
USCG Group Boston – LTJG Jones	

Positive Findings and Progress Made:

- USCG is a recognized member of ATTF in Boston
- ATTF developed email information sharing network and is developing urgent intelligence/security/terrorism alert network & paging system
- ATTF developed Statewide terrorism point-of-contact list (SATURN) for federal, state, and local agencies
- ATTF developed standard "Interview and Observation Report" to be forwarded to MA State Police and FBI for follow-up
- Sharing of New England Regional Threat Analysis Cell, Threat Reporting Review to agencies, including CG, through ATTF
- Outreach & education of *port security* issues through ATTF programs, e.g. Justice Television Network presentation of "Operation Safe Commerce, Ports and World Trade Security"
- Monthly "port law enforcement/intelligence team" meetings; conducted special intelligence sharing gatherings prior to July 4th, and Sept 11th, target dates
- U.S. Customs shares intelligence information weekly in the form of "vessels of interest" to be integrated into MSO's commercial vessel port security boarding program
- Local Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) provides an intelligence brief prior to all High Interest Vessel port security boardings in Boston
- New Field Intelligence Support Team (FIST) concept to be implemented in Boston FY03

- At last Port Security Committee meeting, FBI provided non-law enforcement port stakeholders with websites to access open source intelligence (Awareness National Security Issues and Responses, National Infrastructure Protection Committee, Infraguard)
- COTP shares Transportation Security Information Reports to port community via Port Bulletin
- FBI provided a local terrorism threat assessment brief to small passenger vessel operators at the 2003 MSO Boston Small Passenger Vessel Seminar

Areas for Improvement and Recommendations:

AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT	METHOD	NOTES
Need ability/methods to share information with non-law enforcement port tenants	-Educate stakeholders on means to obtain open source information -Educate stakeholders on existing procedure to share hard intelligence that affects their operation -Distribute TSIRs automatically to port community	
Need terrorism overview briefing for all port tenants	-Prepared unclassified overview using multi-agency approach	

Emerging Best Practices

As has been shown above, there has been an impressive amount of progress with respect to enhancing the security of the port and maritime commerce in and around Boston. While each item of progress is not entirely unique to Boston's Model Port efforts, there are some worthy of mention as "emerging best practices," to be considered for implementation at other ports as well. They are:

- Large Passenger Vessels – The Vessel Security Officer onboard is asked to report security status/compliance with vessel security plan to vessel agent prior to port entry. This positive communication provides assurance that any known security issues are addressed prior to port entry. The use of Customs' X-ray truck to screen vessel stores, and signing of a Declaration of Security between the vessel and terminal to ensure all security requirements are covered, are also considered best practices.

- Intelligence – Raising the awareness of commercial security managers of unclassified industrial security/anti-terror sources such as the National Infrastructure Protection Committee (NIPC) is an important step in furthering the sharing of important threat information between government and private industry.

- Bulk Liquid/LNG – The Volpe Center and Group Boston have partnered to demonstrate vessel positioning and identification system for vessel involved in LNG tanker escorts.

- Consequence Management – Engage the National Guard Civil Support Team in vulnerability assessment and plan development.

Projects Requiring Funding

Through the national Operation Safe Commerce initiative, it is hoped that funding may become available to support some of the above-recommended projects. Enhancements and technologies requiring funding include:

- ✓ CCTV and intrusion detection system for Black Falcon Cruise Terminal
- ✓ Boom/barrier technology for deployment around cruise ships
- ✓ Install radiation/WMD technology to screen import containers, Conley Container Terminal
- ✓ Purchase fixed detection system to inspect export containers arriving at Conley Terminal gate
- ✓ Vessel Traffic Information/Tracking System (would require ownership & staffing as well)
- ✓ Build container stripping facility at Conley Terminal
- ✓ Hire contractor to develop and execute a port security related exercise

Recommendations on Future Activity

Work group recommendations from this first phase of OSC – Boston A Model Port were reviewed and approved by the Steering Committee in October of 2002. During the next phase, phase one of implementation, it is expected that each work group will select 3 priority projects for implementation, with guidance from the Steering Committee, to be completed by December of 2003.

In addition to recommended enhancements, work groups should also consider the following in future work:

- Review results of the formal Port Security Assessment for Boston to identify additional areas for improvement
- Review national "Model Port" criteria for additional ideas
- Develop incentives for private companies that step up and set the example for security enhancements
- As part of the strategy to extend the borders, expand point of origin facility inspections to select container and oil facilities (i.e. Canadian)
- Follow through on implementation of emerging best practices
- Investigate resource efficiencies to screen cruise ship passengers/baggage via airport processes
- Continue to meld intelligence efforts with ATTF and upcoming CG Field Intelligence Support Team (FIST)
- Continue to seek/implement best practices from other ports
- Seek new opportunities for efficiencies as government agencies reorganize within the new Department of Homeland Security framework

Postscript: If any individual involved in this effort has inadvertently been omitted, we offer our sincere apology.